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AVOIDING THE NEED TO “UNSCRAMBLE THE EGG:” A 
PROPOSAL FOR THE AUTOMATIC STAY OF SUBSEQUENT 
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS WHEN PARENTS APPEAL A 
JUDGMENT TERMINATING THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS 
I.  HYPOTHETICAL1 
Imagine that your client, Jane Doe, comes to you and explains that she is in 
desperate need of your help.  As you calmly tell her to explain the facts of her 
problem, Ms. Doe begins by explaining that almost two and a half years ago, 
her two children, A and B, were taken into foster care by State X after she was 
accused of neglecting them.  Although Ms. Doe complied with the goals set by 
the court for reunification, Judge Y terminated her parental rights after fifteen 
months.  She then filed a timely appeal with the appellate court in State X and 
went through the necessary steps to appeal the judgment.  Each side filed many 
extensions, and the appeal took another fifteen months. 
Ms. Doe explains that the appellate court determined that Judge Y was 
incorrect in terminating Ms. Doe’s parental rights.  However, the court also 
explained that it recently came to their attention that thirty days after the 
judgment terminating Ms. Doe’s parental rights, but after Ms. Doe filed her 
appeal, Ms. Doe’s two children were adopted by their foster parents.  Although 
Ms. Doe had no knowledge of the subsequent adoption, the appellate court 
explained that Ms. Doe’s appeal of the judgment terminating her parental 
rights did not automatically stay the subsequent adoption proceedings under 
State X’s adoption statute.  The court further explained that, because Ms. 
Doe’s children had been adopted for over a year, there was nothing that Ms. 
Doe, nor the court, could do to overturn the adoption.  Ms. Doe, obviously 
extremely upset by this turn of events, has come to you asking whether there is 
anything you can legally do to help get her children back. 
Upon researching, you realize with a sinking feeling that the court of 
appeals was correct in their analysis of State X’s laws and that appealing the 
judgment to the Supreme Court of State X could ultimately be fruitless.  You 
then set out on a path to determine whether State X’s law is constitutionally 
sound, and whether there is any possibility of gaining a remedy for Ms. Doe. 
 
 1. Hypothetical is based roughly on the case of In re Tekela.  See generally In re Tekela, 
780 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. 2002). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
446 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:445 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
In November of 1997, President William J. Clinton signed the Adoption 
and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)2 into law.3  With one swift movement 
of his pen, President Clinton modified the then existing Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act of 19804, which primarily promoted reasonable efforts 
to reunify the child and the biological parents.5  The ASFA redefined the 
standard of reasonable efforts, and simultaneously promoted the idea that if 
reasonable efforts did not succeed to reunite the family within fifteen months, 
termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest.6 
To implement the ideas of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, states have 
modified their statutes to set guidelines for judges terminating parental rights 
in compliance with the ASFA.7  Each statute allows the government to utilize 
their police and parens patrae8 powers to remove children from their parent’s 
custody in order to protect those children incapable of helping themselves, to 
promote public welfare and to prevent harm.9  Simultaneously, each state has 
taken strides to ensure that children do not lose precious time lacking 
continuity and stability in the foster care system and are instead placed in safe 
and stable homes by giving judges guidelines and a timeline for terminating 
parental rights.10 
Although such efforts to find safe and stable homes for children should be 
commended, in recent years three supreme court decisions in separate states 
revealed a disturbing problem.11  These cases raise the question of whether 
 
 2. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 7. Steve Christian, National Conference of State Legislatures, 1998 Legislative Responses 
to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 24 STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT (1999), at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/asfaslr.htm. 
 8. Traditionally, the parens patrae power refers to the role of state as a sovereign, and gives 
the government standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen incapable of prosecuting on 
their own.  BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). 
 9. Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the States Burden under 
Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 BU. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 264 (2003). For background 
information on state legislatures’ responses to ASFA, see Christian, supra note 7. 
 10. See Christian, supra note 7. 
 11. The three cases are: 1) In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 312-313 (holding that, although clear 
and convincing evidence of unfitness did not exist to terminate Mother’s parental rights, the 
termination of Mother’s parental rights must be upheld due to the subsequent adoption of 
Mother’s children during her appeal), 2) In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 226 (Mich. 2003) (holding 
that the adoption of Mother’s children, which took place during her appeal, was invalid under 
Michigan law, which provided for the automatic stay of adoption proceedings during appeal), and 
3) State ex rel. T.W. v. Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d 41, 43 (Mo. 2004) (holding that it is an abuse of 
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states have shifted too far in their push to quickly move children into 
permanent homes at the expense of a parent’s right to appeal such judgments.  
In each case, the trial court decided to commence adoption proceedings, and at 
times even finalize such adoptions, while the parents pursued their right to 
appeal the termination judgments underlying, and necessary to, such 
adoptions.12 
This Comment analyzes this startling problem and proposes a statutory 
solution.  It does not suggest that states should not terminate the rights of unfit 
parents when termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.  
Nor does this Comment suggest that adoption is not in the best interest of the 
child after a legal termination has occurred.  Instead, this Comment suggests 
that states have swung too far in their attempt to comply with the ASFA, 
trampling on the rights of parents to appeal any judgment made against them.  
By failing to provide for automatic stays when parents appeal a wrongful 
judgment terminating their parental rights and instead finalizing adoptions 
before a decision on the appeal is rendered, states have effectively taken away 
the right to appeal. 
Section III of this Comment examines the historical background of today’s 
state statutes, focusing primarily on the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997 and state responses to the ASFA legislation.  Section IV analyzes recent 
case law, which reveals a problem regarding subsequent adoptions following 
the appeal from judgments terminating parental rights.  Section V contains the 
author’s analysis of the problem, focusing on both constitutional and policy 
concerns.  Section V proposes a model statute, which provides for automatic 
stays of any ongoing or subsequent adoption proceedings upon notice of a 
timely appeal of the underlying judgment terminating parental rights.  In 
addition, this proposal provides for an expedited appellate process in order to 
prevent children from languishing in the foster care system and to comply with 
the mandates set forth in the ASFA.  Section V also analyzes how this proposal 
satisfies constitutional due process concerns as well as public policy concerns 
that arise when states fail to stay adoption proceedings upon appeal. 
 
discretion for a circuit court to proceed with an adoption of children who were the subject of a 
termination of parental rights while an appeal of the termination is pending).  See also In the 
Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that although the 
termination of parental rights was affirmed, the subsequent adoption that took place during the 
appeal should be reversed under the Florida statute providing for automatic stays pending appeal); 
In the Interest of Baby Boy N, 874 P.2d 680, 690-91 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the trial 
court did not have jurisdiction to enter an order of adoption, as operation of the order terminating 
the father’s parental rights was suspended as soon as the father filed notice of appeal of the 
termination order); Jean Ann Kobinski v. The State of Nevada Welfare Division, 738 P.2d 895, 
897-98 (Nev. 1987) (stating as dictum concern with Nevada’s procedure of finalizing an adoption 
pending appeal, but upholding the subsequent adoption due to their affirmance of the underlying 
termination). 
 12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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III.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
Beginning in 1980, states received guidance in structuring their individual 
foster care and adoption statutes from the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980.13  However, significant problems in implementing the 
ambiguous mandate for “reasonable efforts” and a strong policy for 
reunification14 led to a disturbing rise in the number of children coming into, 
and either remaining in, or returning to the foster care system.15  As a result, 
more children were entering foster care than were exiting into safe, permanent 
and stable placements.16  In 1997, there were over five hundred thousand 
children nationwide in the foster case system,17 and the number was rapidly 
increasing.18  In response to increased concern over nation-wide trends,19 the 
 
 13. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 14. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act mandated that in order to remain 
eligible for federal funding, “reasonable efforts will be made prior to the placement of a child in 
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home and to make it 
possible for the child to return to his home.”  Id. at § 101. 
 15. Cristine H. Kim, Comment, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts 
Requirement in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 292 (1999) (explaining that 
states were placing great emphasis on goals of family preservation and reunification, which 
caused children to “languish[] in foster care” and “remain[] in limbo as to their permanency”).  
See also 143 Cong. Rec. S12,669 (1997) (testimony of Sen. Dewine) (stating that “[t]here can be 
no doubt that this problem did, in fact, arise because of the 1980 law, and it arose because this 
1980 law was and has been for 17 years misinterpreted”). 
 16. United States General Accounting Office report to the Chairmen, Subcommittee on 
Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Juvenile Courts: 
Reforms Aim to Better serve Maltreated Children at 8 (1999), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99013.pdf.  This phenomenon is known as a “foster care 
drift,” where children languish in the foster care system “because permanent goals were not 
established, maintained and carried out.”  Del A. v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1313 (E.D. La. 
1991).  See also Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium, The Promise and Failure of 
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 643 (1999) (explaining that 
“[m]any of these children [in foster care] lacked any prospect of going to a permanent home any 
time soon, and were instead ‘drifting’ among multiple homes for long periods of time”). 
 17. Foster care is defined as: 
24-hour substitute care for children placed away from their parents or guardians and for 
whom the State agency has placement and care responsibility.  This includes, but is not 
limited to, placements in foster family homes, foster homes of relatives, group homes, 
emergency shelters, residential facilities, child care institutions, and preadoptive homes. 
45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2004). 
 18. Christian, supra note 7 (reporting that at the end of 1985, the number of children in 
foster care totaled 270,000 while by the end of 1996, the total was approximately 502,000). 
 19. In addition to the concern over the number of children currently stagnant in the foster 
care system, legislators were also concerned with incidences of murder among children returned 
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One Hundred and Fifth Congress passed, and on November 19, 1997, 
President Clinton signed, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) 
into federal law.20 
The ASFA is widely accepted as one of the most significant pieces of 
federal child welfare legislation in United States history.21  The purpose of the 
ASFA is primarily to promote the adoption of children who are currently in 
foster care.22  In order to fulfill this goal, the ASFA provides states with 
procedural guidance, which was previously lacking under the Child Welfare 
Act of 1980.23 
First, the ASFA provides states with guidance in determining reasonable 
efforts and safety requirements for foster care and adoption.24  Unless the 
family situation falls within a few clearly defined exceptions,25 the ASFA 
requires that states make reasonable efforts for twelve months to reunify and 
preserve the family unit and make it possible for the child to return home.26  
Although the ASFA does not define reasonable efforts, it does provide that “in 
determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to the child, as 
described in this paragraph, and in making such reasonable efforts, the child’s 
health and safety shall be the paramount concern.”27 
Secondly, the ASFA sets a timetable explaining when states should begin 
termination proceedings after a child has been in foster care and the state has 
 
to their biological parents, the detrimental effect that allowing for eighteen months to attempt 
reunification has on the waiting child, the number of time extensions allowed by states, and 
permanent plans which allowed children to remain in unstable long-term foster placements.  
ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CHILD RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 314 (Diana G. Collier ed. 2002). 
 20. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 21. Christian, supra note 7.  With the enactment of the ASFA legislation, each state was 
required to enact numerous extensive changes to their state laws and policies in order to remain 
eligible for funds previously more easily available under the Social Security Act.  Id. 
 22. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101.  See also Katherine A. Hort, 
Comment, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child? ASFA’s Guidelines for 
the Termination of Parental Rights,  28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879, 1894-95 (2001). 
 23. Compare Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 
Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) with Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 24. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101(a)(15); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000). 
 25. Reasonable efforts are not required if the parent has 1) subjected the child to “aggravated 
circumstances” including abandonment, torture, chronic abuse and sexual abuse, 2) committed, 
aided and abetted, attempted, conspired or solicited to commit murder or manslaughter of another 
child, committed felony assault that results in serious bodily injury of another child, or 3) the 
parental rights to another child have been involuntarily terminated.  Id. at § 101(a)(15)(D); 42 
U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). 
 26. Id. at § 101(a)(15)(B)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii).  This is a change from the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, which required states to make reasonable 
efforts towards reunification for at least eighteen months.  FELLMETH, supra note 19, at 314. 
 27. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101(a)(15)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A). 
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made reasonable efforts toward reunification.28  In setting the guidelines, many 
different versions of a timeline were introduced.29  One timeline proposed that 
states should be required to initiate termination proceedings after a child had 
been in care 18 of the last 24 months.30  Another plan proposed that the 
timetable should be hastened, requiring termination proceedings after the child 
had been in care only 12 of the last 18 months.31  Ultimately, the ASFA offered 
a compromise, providing that if a child has been in foster care for 15 of the 
most recent 22 months the state is required to file a petition to begin 
termination proceedings and “concurrently to identify, recruit, process, and 
approve a qualified family for adoption.”32 
Finally, in addition to providing both guidance to the states in their 
reasonable effort requirements, and a timeline for termination proceedings, the 
ASFA provided for monetary “adoption incentive payments” to states for each 
foster child adopted over and above a “base number”33 in a given year.34  
Under ASFA guidelines, each state would receive four thousand dollars for 
 
 28. Id. at § 101(a)(3)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
 29. Compare Adoption Promotion Act of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. § 3 (a)(3)(E) (1997) 
and Promotion of Adoption, Safety, and Support for Abused and Neglected Children (PASS) Act, 
H.R. 867, 105th Cong. §104(a)(3)(E) (1997) with Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, H.R. 
867, 105th Cong. § 103(a)(3)(E) (1997) (enacted). 
 30. Adoption Promotion Act of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(E).  See also 143 
Cong. Rec. H. 2016 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement by Rep. Shaw) (describing the Adoption 
Promotion Act of 1997 as “require[ing] States to move to terminate parental rights parental rights 
and find an adoptive family if children under 10 have been in foster care for 18 of the past 24 
months”). 
 31. See Promotion of Adoption, Safety, and Support for Abused and Neglected Children 
(PASS) Act, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. §104(a)(3)(e).  See also 143 Cong. Rec. H. 2027 (statement 
of Rep. Tiahrt) (describing the PASS Act as “reduc[ing] a timeframe for the State to seek to 
terminate parental rights from 18 to 12 months”). 
 32. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 103(a)(3)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). Note 
that the state does not have to file the petition to terminate parental rights if the child is being 
cared for by a relative or if the state has not provided the services necessary for the safe return of 
the child to the child’s home. Id. § 103(a)(3)(E)(i)-(iii), § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii). 
 33. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 § 
201(g)(3)(A)-(B) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  In the original legislation, the base 
number for fiscal year 1998 was the average number of foster child adoptions in fiscal years 
1995, 1996, and 1997.  Id.  The base number for subsequent fiscal years was the number of foster 
child adoptions in the fiscal year with the greatest number of foster care adoptions since 1997.  Id.  
The current version of the legislation sets the base number fiscal year 2003 at the number of 
foster child adoptions in fiscal year 2002.  Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 § 4(c)(5)(A), 42 
U.S.C. § 673b(g)(3)(A) (2000).  For subsequent years, the base number is the number of foster 
child adoptions in the fiscal year with the greatest number of foster care adoptions since 2002.  Id. 
at § 4(c)(5)(B), § 673b(g)(3)(B). 
 34. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 201(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1) (providing 
the amounts of adoption incentive payments due for a fiscal year to a State). 
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every adoption completed over the base number as well as an additional two 
thousand dollars for every child adopted with “special needs.”35 
Many bipartisan groups supported the ASFA,36 and the ultimate goal of the 
legislation seemed to be standard across all arenas: “to ensure that abused, 
neglected children are in safe settings and to move children more rapidly out of 
the foster care system.”37  Although the ASFA provides clear guidelines for 
states in terminating parental rights, the legislation provides no procedural 
guidance to states in circumstances where the system breaks down and parental 
rights are wrongfully or prematurely terminated.38  Although the ASFA 
provides an overall goal of promoting adoption and diminishing the number of 
children “languishing” in the foster care system, the ASFA does not provide 
guidance for states in how to proceed during an appellate process.39 
Although a few legislators testifying at the legislative hearings discussed 
maintaining a parent’s right to appeal,40 the great majority of legislators mainly 
focused on pinpointing a way to proceed quickly and more efficiently to 
permanency and adoption for children in foster care.41  An overwhelming 
number of those who testified at the legislative hearings made no mention of 
preserving the right to appeal, but focused instead on the intention that the 
ASFA would prompt states to enact their own legislation in compliance with 
 
 35. Id.  Because the original legislation did not allow adoption incentive payments after 
fiscal year 2003, President George W. Bush expanded the availability of the adoption incentive 
payments until fiscal year 2008.  Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 § 3(a)(2)(B), (C).  See also 42 
U.S.C. § 673b(b)(5).  In addition, the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 furnished additional 
payments of four thousand dollars for foster care adoptions of children over nine years old, which 
were classified as “older child adoptions.”  Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 § 3(a)(3)(C).  See 
also 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1)(C). 
 36. Hort, supra note 22, at 1894 (stating that the act “had tremendous bipartisan support” 
and explaining that organizations such as the Heritage Foundation and Child Defense Fund 
endorsed the legislation). 
 37. Child Welfare Revisions: Hearing of the Social Security and Family Policy Subcomm. of 
the Senate Finance Comm. 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Child Welfare Revisions] (statement 
of Sen. John Chafee).  See also 143 Cong. Rec. S12671 (1997) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller); 
United States General Accounting Office report to the Chairmen, Subcommittee on Human 
Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Juvenile Courts: Reforms 
Aim to Better serve Maltreated Children at 8 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/ 
1999/he99013.pdf. 
 38. See generally Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 
2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Hearing upon the Promotion of Adoption Safety and Support for Abused and Neglected 
Children (PASS) Act Before the Senate Finance Comm. 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] 
(statement of Sen. Mary L. Landrieu) (stating that the legislators should not inhibit parents from 
exhausting their legal rights). 
 41. Id; 143 Cong. Rec. S12671 (1997) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller); Child Welfare 
Revisions, supra note 37. 
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the federal mandates to allow for faster termination proceedings, and a greater 
number of adoptions.42 
B.  State Statutory Action Following the ASFA 
Largely, the ASFA legislation left a great deal of discretion to the states in 
determining which changes should be made to their state legislation to ensure 
compliance with the ASFA.43  With incentives provided by the federal 
government,44 today each state has enacted legislation to conform to the 
requirements of the ASFA.45  The great majority of state statutes now provide 
for initiating termination proceedings when a child has been in state care for 15 
of the last 22 months, as provided by the ASFA.46  In addition, each state 
statute lays out further provisions which judges use as guidelines to determine 
when the state has provided “reasonable efforts” for reunification, and when 
grounds exist to justify terminating a parent’s rights.47  Although all states have 
 
 42. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 40; 143 Cong. Rec. S12671 (1997) (statement of Sen. 
Rockefeller); Child Welfare Revisions, supra note 37 (testimony of Rep. Camp). 
 43. Christian, supra note 7. 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1) (describing the incentive payments “payable to a State”). 
 45. Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First Three Years 
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 25, 32 (2001).  The 
National Conference on State Legislatures has published a searchable database of all states’ 
implementing legislation.  National Conference on State Legislatures, Summaries of State 
Legislation Enacted in Response to the Adoption and Safe Families Act, at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
statefed/cf/asfasearch.htm (updated 2001). 
 46. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088(d)(1) (Michie 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-
604(2)(k) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623(i) (Michie 2004); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
405/2-13(4.5)(a)(i) (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. §31-35-2-4.5(2)(B) (West 2005); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 232.111(2)(a)(1) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4052(2A)(A) (West 2004); 
MD. CODE ANN., [FAM. LAW] § 5-525.1(b)(1)(i) (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 
26(4)(iii) (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(1) (2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
6351(f)(9) (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1(e)(6) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
768(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5b(a)(1) (Michie 2004); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 48.417(1)(a) (West 2004).  But see, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7b-907(d) (2005) (providing 
for a termination petition to be filed after a child has been in care 12 out of the most recent 22 
months); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(b)(2) (2003) (providing for a termination petition to be 
filed after a child has been in care for 450 out of 660 nights); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2151.413(D) (West 2004) (providing for a termination petition to be filed after a child has been in 
care for 12 of the most recent 22 months). 
 47. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (Michie 2004); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie 
2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-846 (West 
2004); ARK CODE. ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 
2004); FL. STAT. ANN. § 39.701 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE § 16-1615 (Michie 2004); 705 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-13.1 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-21-5.6 (West 2005); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4041 (West 
2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (West 
2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.183 (West 2004); MO. ANN. 
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adopted provisions in compliance with the federal law, many variations exist in 
the exact provisions states have chosen.48 
Similarly, just as states have enacted different statutes regarding the 
termination of parental rights, states have responded to the lack of direction 
given in the ASFA by taking vastly different statutory stances on the effect of 
appealing a judgment wrongfully terminating parental rights.  Although a 
judgment terminating parental rights is considered a “final judgment,” which 
allows dissatisfied parties to appeal, each state has a different interpretation of 
whether such an appeal should stay the underlying judgment and any 
subsequent adoption proceedings until a decision is rendered.  A minority of 
states specifically provide for automatic stays of the underlying termination 
judgment and subsequent adoptions upon notice of an appeal.49  Other states 
 
STAT. § 211.447 (West 2004); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 41-3-423 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 
(2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-507 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
15-7-7 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-768 (Law. Co-op. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-763 
(Law Co-op. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (Law Co-op. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
166 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-313.5 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-311 (2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-203 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-203.5 (2004); VA. CODE. 
ANN. § 16.1-283 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.190 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 49-6-3b (Michie 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5b (Michie 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
14-2-309 (Michie 2004). 
 48. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (Michie. 2004); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie. 
2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533 (West 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-846 (West 
2004); ARK CODE. ANN. § 9-27-341 (Michie 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 
2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129 (WEST 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.701 (West 2004); 
IDAHO CODE § 16-1615 (Michie 2004); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623 (Michie 2001); 705 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 405/2-13 (West 2004); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2-13.1 (West 2004); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 31-35-2-4.5 (West 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-21-5.6 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 232.111 (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22, § 4041 (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (West 2004); MD. CODE 
ANN., [FAM. LAW] § 5-525.1 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 26 (West 2005); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 260C.301 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 (2004); MO. ANN. REV. 
STAT. § 232.111 (West 2004); MO. ANN. REV. STAT. § 211.183 (West 2004); MO. ANN. REV. 
STAT. § 211.447 (West 2004); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 41-3-423 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 
(2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7b-507 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7b-907 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
27-20-44 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.413 (West 2004); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
6351 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-12.1 (2004); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-7-768 (Law. Co-op. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-763 (Law. Co-op. 2004); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (Law. Co-op. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-166 (2004); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-313.5 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-311 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
62A-4a-203 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-203.5 (2004); VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-283 
(Michie 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.190 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-3b 
(Michie 2004); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-5b (Michie 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415 (West 2004); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.417 (West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309 (Michie 2004). 
 49. E..g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §366.26(b)(1) (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
9.146(c)(2) (West 2005); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305(e); KAN. STAT. ANN.  §59-2407 (2003); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.56(2)(c) (West 2004). 
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allow for the stay of the termination judgment and subsequent adoptions, but 
only upon a motion made to the trial court that entered the judgment, and at 
times, upon issuance of a bond.50  Moreover, some states fail to specifically 
discuss the effect that an appeal will have on a judgment terminating parental 
rights, and because of this oversight, the judiciary is forced to piece together an 
answer based on the effect of appeals in other areas of the law.51 
IV.  RECENT CASES REVEAL A DISTURBING PROBLEM 
Recently, case law from the supreme courts of Illinois, Michigan and 
Missouri have revealed a problem that stems from the wide variety of 
procedural guidelines that states have enacted to deal with the effect of 
appealing the judgment terminating parental rights on adoption proceedings 
and the underlying judgment.52  In each of the following cases, the courts 
examined their state’s controlling statute and decided whether the trial court 
was correct in allowing the child to be adopted after a timely appeal was 
initiated or if the trial court should have instead suspended or stayed the 
proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal.53 
A. In re Tekela54 
In August of 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court faced a situation in In re 
Tekela, where a mother’s rights were terminated and, pending appeal, her two 
children were adopted.55  In March of 1993, two of Wanda Cooper’s 
(“Mother’s”) three children, Ira and Tekela, were placed in foster care by the 
State of Illinois after allegations of abuse.56  Over four years later, in August of 
1997, the State of Illinois petitioned the circuit court to terminate Mother’s 
parental rights, alleging that Mother suffered from a mental illness and would 
be unable to discharge her parental responsibilities.57 
 
 50. E.g., ARIZ. STAT. JUV. CT. P. R. 88; IDAHO CODE §16-1617 (Michie 2004); LA. 
CHILDRENS CODE. art. 336(A) (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §170-C:15 (2004). 
 51. Compare MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.011 (West 2004) with State ex rel. T.W. v. 
Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 2004). 
 52. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 304; In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216; State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d 
41. 
 53. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 304; In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216; State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d 
41. 
 54. 780 N.E.2d 304. 
 55. Id. at 305. 
 56. Id. at 306. 
 57. Id.  Simultaneously, the State petitioned the court to appoint the Division of Child and 
Family Services as guardian of the children with the power to consent to an adoption of mother’s 
three children.  Id. 
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In December of 1998, the State filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
which Mother promptly objected to in writing.58  On April 3, 1999, the court 
granted the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment, terminating Mother’s 
parental rights and concurrently appointing a guardian for both Ira and Tekela, 
who could consent to their adoption.59  One month later, on May 7, 1999, 
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, consistent with requirements set forth 
by Illinois statute, arguing that issues of material fact existed at the time the 
judgment was made, making summary judgment improper.60 
In February of 2001, the appellate court reversed the decision of the circuit 
court, stating summary judgment and “[t]ermination of parental rights [are] 
drastic measure[s] and, accordingly, the facts must be reviewed with close 
scrutiny.”61  The appellate court stated there were unresolved questions of 
material fact regarding whether Mother’s mental illness left her unable to 
discharge her parental responsibilities.62  Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme 
Court found that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment.63 
Approximately a week after the appellate court issued its judgment, the 
public guardian assigned to the case by the circuit court filed a motion to 
vacate the appellate court’s decision and informed the appellate court for the 
first time that both Ira and Tekela had been adopted by their foster parents in 
September of 1999.64  The adoption took place four months after Mother filed 
her notice of appeal.65  The appellate court denied the guardian’s motion to 
vacate, expressing doubt about whether the adoption was legally valid in light 
of the appellate courts decision to reverse the termination order.66  The Illinois 
Supreme Court expressly stated, “neither the State nor the public guardian 
challenge the substance of the appellate court’s February 20, 2001, ruling that 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d, at 306.  The circuit court simultaneously terminated the 
parental rights of Father; however, Father did not appeal the judgment and therefore is not 
involved in the present appeal.  Id. 
 60. Id. In her appeal, Mother raised a constitutional question of whether the use of summary 
judgment to terminate parental rights violates due process; however the court explained that 
answering the constitutional question was not necessary in deciding the case.  People v. Cooper 
(In re T.J.), 745 NE.2d 608, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 61. Id. at 616. 
 62. Id. at 617-18 (stating that “the question of whether a parent has a mental illness or 
impairment that prevents her from discharging her parental duties, unlike the question of whether 
a parent has a conviction for a particular crime, is a nuanced, fact-intensive question that does not 
readily lend itself to summary determination”). 
 63. Id. at 618 (explaining that before terminating mother’s parental rights, the court should 
have examined how mother would function as a parent with medication and therapy, and a 
psychological assessment should have been obtained to examine how mother performed her 
parental responsibilities). 
 64. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 306. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 307. 
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summary judgment was inappropriate in this case.”67  Instead, the State argued 
that, although Mother’s rights should not have been terminated through the 
summary judgment proceeding, the decision by the appellate court was moot 
because Mother’s children had already been adopted for over a year at the time 
of the appellate court’s decision.68 
Under then current Illinois statutes, in order to effectively preclude the 
lower court from finalizing an adoption while the appeal was pending, Mother 
should have filed a motion to stay the underlying judgment when she appealed 
the underlying judgment terminating her parental rights.69  Although the court 
acknowledged that statutes in other states provided for automatic stays when 
an order terminating parental rights is appealed,70 in Illinois the stay was not an 
automatic occurrence.71  In addition, under Illinois law, once a child has been 
adopted for a term of one year, the adoption is final and unappealable.72  
Although this statutory scheme provided children with permanent placements, 
it also left parents without a remedy if their rights had been erroneously 
terminated.73 
In reversing the order of the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court 
explained that they were bound by then current Illinois law, which required the 
parent to request a stay to “protect that right [to appeal] and to take necessary 
steps to preserve the fruits of [that parent’s] appeal.”74  However, the court also 
acknowledged that a stay is necessary to preserve the status quo pending 
appeal due to the short period of time that normally elapses between the entry 
of an order terminating parental rights and the subsequent adoption enforcing 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 308 (stating that “[a] notice of appeal is not an application of 
stay within the meaning of this court’s rules”). 
 70. The court expressly referenced Florida’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provided 
for the automatic stay of any subsequent adoption during the appeal of the termination of parental 
rights.  Id. at 308 n.1.  See generally FLA. R. APP. P. § 9.146. 
 71. See In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 308 (stating that “in this case, Wanda failed to request a 
stay . . .”) (emphasis in original).  The current version of the Illinois Supreme Court Rule has 
changed, allowing for the automatic stay of the termination of parental rights upon notice of an 
appeal, and prohibits “entry of an order of adoption without the parent’s consent or surrender, and 
shall also operate to stay the termination order with respect to any power granted to a person or 
agency to consent to an adoption.”  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305(e)(2). 
 72. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 310. 
 73. See id. at 311 (explaining that “[w]hile our constitution guarantees a right to meaningful 
appellate review, it does not necessarily guarantee relief on the merits or relief that will be 
acceptable to the appellant”).  “No procedural principal is more familiar . . . than that a 
constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make 
timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.”  Id. at 308 
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 751 (1991)). 
 74. Id. at 308. 
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that order.75  Although the court expressed concern and frustration with the 
situation at hand, the court was compelled by Illinois law to reinstate the 
termination order due to the subsequent adoption that occurred during the 
appeal.76 
In a strong dissent, Chief Justice Harrison noted that Mother had a 
fundamental right to appeal the judgment entered against her under Illinois 
law.77  Justice Harrison noted that the State of Illinois provided that “[a] 
condition precedent to an adoption is either consent of the parent or a finding 
by the court that consent is not required for the reason of unfitness.”78  Justice 
Harrison argued that, because the court of appeals found that Mother’s parental 
rights were not legally terminated, and Mother did not consent to the adoption, 
Ira and Tekela were not eligible for adoption.79  He further explained that the 
failure to request a stay from the trial court should not preclude Mother from 
appealing nor leave her without a remedy.80 
Overall, both sides expressed frustration regarding the statutory system 
they were required to follow.81  While still advocating for permanency and 
stability for the children the state is trying to protect, both the majority and the 
dissent strongly expressed a need for a change in Illinois law to prevent a 
similar situation from occurring in the future.82  In response, the Illinois 
legislature amended their rule regarding appeals and now provides for 
automatic stays of subsequent adoption proceedings upon notice of an appeal 
from the judgment terminating parental rights.83 
B. In re J.K.84 
In 2003, the Michigan Supreme Court faced a situation similar to that seen 
only one year before in Illinois.85  In 1999, the State of Michigan took 
 
 75. Id.  The court explained later in the opinion that an adoption is normally completed 
between three months and a year after the termination of parental rights.  In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 
at 312. 
 76. Id. at 312-13 (noting that “structured reforms are obviously necessary” in this area). 
 77. Id. at 313 (Harrison, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 314 (Harrison, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. While Chief Justice Harrison acknowledged the need for finality and stability in the 
adoption process he noted that “finality and stability cannot excuse the failure to effectuate an 
adoption that complies with the law.”  In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 315 (Harrison, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 314 (Harrison, J., dissenting). 
 81. See generally id. at 311-12 (stating that the court is dealing with critical issues of 
children and families and expressing a need for “structured reform”); id. at 315 (Harrison, J., 
dissenting)(stating that by allowing the adoption to take place “the majority has embarked on a 
dangerous course” as “once the adoption decree is entered, the natural parents will be left with no 
recourse”). 
 82. See id. at 312-16. 
 83. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305(e). 
 84. 661 N.W.2d 216 (Mich. 2003). 
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jurisdiction over sixteen month old JK after respondent (“Mother”) admitted to 
using marijuana.86  Mother complied with all of the goals set by the court by 
entering into substance abuse counseling, participating in an assistive living 
program, retaining employment, securing housing, caring for herself, visiting 
with her child and attending to her child’s needs.87  However, despite these 
efforts, the State petitioned for termination of Mother’s parental rights, citing 
as its only basis for termination a lack of attachment and bonding with the 
child, which was disputed by psychiatrists.88 
Mother first appealed the decision terminating her parental rights to the 
court of appeals, who affirmed the judgment.89  Mother then filed a timely 
application to appeal the judgment to the Michigan Supreme Court, and filed a 
copy of the application to appeal with the trial court.90  However, before the 
court ruled on the application, and before a hearing date was scheduled, the 
trial court entered an order finalizing the adoption of Mother’s child by the 
current foster parents.91 
Under Michigan law, when an appeal from the judgment terminating 
parental rights is filed, the Michigan Adoption Code prohibits a trial court from 
entering an order of adoption until the court of appeals affirms the 
termination.92  The county in this case admitted they did not comply with the 
adoption code, but instead designated the subsequent adoption as “at risk” of 
being overturned by the appellate court.93 
Ultimately, the court held there was not clear and convincing evidence that 
Mother’s parental rights should have been terminated,94 and found it disturbing 
that the trial court proceeded with the adoption pending the appeal in the 
supreme court.95  The court explained that in doing so, the trial court ignored 
 
 85. See generally id.  The Michigan court analyzed the situation under the Michigan 
Adoption Code.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.56(2) (West 2004). 
 86. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 218. 
 87. Id. at 220. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 221.  This decision was rendered in an unpublished memorandum opinion on 
March 1, 2002.  Id. at 221 n.15. 
 90. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 221. 
 91. Id.  The Court was only informed of the subsequent adoption after requesting updated 
findings of fact from the trial court in August, 2002.  Id. at 220 n.16. 
 92. Id. at 224.  See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.56(2) (West 2004). 
 93. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 225 n.25.  The court explained that the adoption was labeled “at 
risk” because the county understood there was a risk that the court could vacate the termination of 
parental rights, thereby invalidating the adoption.  Id. 
 94. Id. at 222-23 (explaining that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
there was either a lack of bond and attachment between Mother and child or a lack in Mother’s 
ability to provide proper care and custody of her child). 
 95. Id. at 225. 
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the supreme court’s power to review decisions.96  Although the supreme court 
felt the statute prohibiting such adoptions was clear, they clarified it by stating 
that “[i]n order to prevent this situation from recurring, we hold that trial courts 
are not permitted to allow an adoption of a child whose parent’s rights have 
been terminated while the parent’s appeal of that termination is pending in 
either the court of appeals or this [Supreme] Court.”97  Therefore, the supreme 
court reversed the decision terminating Mother’s parental rights and vacated 
the order of adoption as invalid.98 
C. State ex. rel. T.W. v. Ohmer99 
In the spring of 2004, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled on a situation 
mirroring those that the courts in both Illinois and Michigan faced.100  In State 
ex. rel. T.W. v. The Honorable Steven R. Ohmer, Judge, Mother’s twin 
daughters, KAW and KAW, were taken into custody by the State of Missouri 
after two failed attempts to place them, with Mother’s consent, into adoptive 
homes.101  Before her twins were born, Mother decided that she would 
voluntarily place her children for adoption in order to “give them a better 
life.”102  The twins were born premature, and throughout their two-month 
hospital stay, Mother visited her children and cared for them.103  After finding 
two adoptive families, both of whom were deemed unfit,104 Mother decided 
she was capable of raising her children herself, and took strides to meet the 
goals set by the trial court to regain custody of her children.105  Despite her 
efforts, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights in December of 
2002.106  Mother then appealed the trial court’s judgment, but while the appeal 
was pending the trial court proceeded with the adoption of KAW and KAW to 
their foster parents in April of 2003.107 
Concurrently ruling in a separate opinion that the state did not have 
sufficient evidence to legally terminate mother’s parental rights,108 the 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 226 (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. 
 99. 133 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. 2004). 
 100. Id. 
 101. In the Interest of K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. 2004). 
 102. Id. at 6. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Mother regarded the first adoptive family unfit after visiting them and learning that they 
did not wish to retain contact with her after the adoption.  Id.  British adoption officials deemed 
the second prospective adoptive family unfit.  Id. 
 105. In the Interest of K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d, at 7. 
 106. Id. at 8. 
 107. State ex rel. T.W. v. Ohmer, 133 S.W.3d at 41, 42 (Mo. 2004). 
 108. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 21 (stating that “Mother’s parental rights were terminated 
because of little more than her efforts to find an adoptive family for her twins”).  The Supreme 
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Missouri Supreme Court granted mother a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the 
trial court judge from taking any further action consistent with an adoption, 
and ordered the trial judge to set aside the decree of adoption.109  Although 
Missouri juvenile law does not specifically provide for automatic stays of 
adoption proceedings upon an appeal of an order terminating a parent’s 
rights,110 the supreme court ruled that “[i]t is an abuse of discretion and a 
circuit court lacks the power to proceed with adoption of a child who has been 
the subject of a termination of parental rights while an appeal of the judgment 
terminating parental rights is pending.”111  The Missouri Supreme Court, like 
the Michigan Supreme Court also noted that “[p]roceeding with adoption while 
the termination is reviewed on appeal compromises the parent’s right to 
appellate review by requiring, as an effective precondition to reversal of the 
termination, that the appellate court be prepared to address a separate adoption 
proceeding.”112  Although the Missouri statutes were ambiguous as to whether 
stays should be automatic pending appeals in termination cases,113 the Missouri 
Supreme Court construed the statute as requiring automatic stays of the 
underlying termination judgment and any subsequent adoptions pending 
appeal.114 
V.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
The above cases demonstrate the problem that occurs when children are 
adopted while the underlying judgment terminating parental rights is 
undergoing appellate review.  If the underlying termination judgment is 
reversed after an appeal has taken place, the result can be devastating, not only 
to the relationship existing between the biological parent and child, but also to 
the relationship being created between the adoptive parents and the child.  
Although the courts in Missouri and Michigan ultimately rendered a decision 
seemingly consistent with due process and the right to appeal, each court 
expressed frustration and great concern over the effects of overturning the 
 
Court stated that 1) Mother’s placement of her children for adoption did not constitute emotional 
abuse, 2) Mother’s feelings of being overwhelmed were normal for a mother of five on welfare 
and did not constitute abuse or a mental impairment, 3) the trial court’s finding that Mother’s 
children suffered from attachment disorder was not supported by clear and cogent and convincing 
evidence, 4) the trial court’s findings of lack of familial support for Mother were not supported by 
clear and cogent and convincing evidence and 5) the trial courts findings of a lack of emotional 
ties between Mother and the children was not supported by clear and cogent and convincing 
evidence. Id. at 12-16. 
 109. State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d at 43. 
 110. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.011 (West 2004). 
 111. State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d at 43. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.011 (West 2004). 
 114. State ex. rel T.W., 133 S.W.3d at 43. 
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termination of parental rights after a subsequent adoption has been finalized.115  
On the other hand, there is also great concern over the lack of remedy available 
under state statutes that do not provide for automatic stays.116  Although there 
is no easy answer,117 it is clear that a significant problem exists in the outcome 
of the Illinois case.  Such outcome should prompt state judges and legislators 
nationwide to be proactive in their advocacy by examining their own state 
statutes and advocating for change if their statutes do not provide for automatic 
stays, just as the Illinois legislature did after realizing the error of their own 
decision. 
A. Constitutional Concerns 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution “provides 
heightened protection against government interference with certain 
fundamental rights and liberty interests” that are rooted in United States history 
and traditions and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.118  It has been long 
established and accepted by the Supreme Court that natural parents have a 
fundamental liberty interest in the “care, custody and management of their 
child.”119  This fundamental liberty interest is protected by the Fourteenth 
 
 115. See Id.; In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 225.  See also In the Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d at 
275 (stating that after a termination proceeding an order of adoption shall not be entered until it is 
clear that the adoption will not be affected by an appeal, as reversing an order terminating 
parental rights after a subsequent adoption could cause serious consequences); In the Interest of 
Baby Boy N, 874 P.2d 680, 691 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that “setting aside an adoption 
decree is an extreme decision and is fraught with possible consequences”). 
 116. See In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 312 (stating that there is a “compelling need for 
structured reform in this area”).  See also Jean Ann Kobinski v. The State of Nevada, Welfare 
Division, 738 P.2d 895, 898 (Nev. 1987) (stating that “[a]lthough our statutes do not expressly 
preclude the finalization of an adoption under these circumstances, the possibility of future 
trauma to the child implicates public policy and justifies refusal to enter an adoption decree . . .”). 
 117. See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 225 (stating that “[t]here is no outcome that will avoid the 
imposition of suffering upon either the birth parent of this child or his present adoptive parents”). 
 118. Washington v. Gluxberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). 
 119. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (stating that freedom of personal 
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 
431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 651-52 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  The 
principal that parents have a fundamentally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of 
their children is also widely accepted by states.  E.g., G.W.B. v. J.S.W., So. 2d 961, 966-67 (Fla. 
1995); In the Interest of Doe,  57 P.3d 447, 458 (Haw. 2001); Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37, 40 
(Ark. 1979); State v. Renetta D., 571 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Neb. 1997); Jason S. V. Vally Hosp. 
Med. Ctr., 87 P.3d 521, 527 (Nev. 2004); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 288 (N.D. 1999); In re 
Murray, 556 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ohio 1990); Greenville County Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Bowes, 
437 S.E.2d 107, 110-11 (S.C. 1993); In the Matter of S.H., 337 N.W.2d 179, 181 (S.D. 1983); 
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause,120 and includes the rights of parents to 
establish a home, raise their children and control their children’s education, as 
well as to nurture their children and control their destiny.121  The right of a 
parent to raise their children is, in fact, one of the oldest fundamental liberty 
interests that has been recognized by the Supreme Court.122  In addition, the 
Court has stated that the fundamental liberty interest existing between parent 
and child “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection.”123 
In noting this, the Supreme Court has held that the fundamental liberty 
interest held by parents is not lost when parents lose custody to the state or are 
not “model parents.”124  Although the relationship between the parent and child 
may be strained, both parents and children continue to retain a vital interest in 
preventing the destruction of the parent-child relationship.125  The Court has 
acknowledged that a termination proceeding interferes with the parent’s 
fundamental liberty interest and therefore held that when a state attempts to 
destroy familial bonds, the state must provide for fundamentally fair 
procedures.126  In holding, the Court stated: 
The fact that the important liberty interests of the child and its foster parents 
may also be affected by a permanent neglect proceeding does not justify 
denying the natural parents constitutionally adequate procedures.  Nor can the 
State refuse to provide natural parents adequate procedural safeguards on the 
ground that the family unit already has broken down; that is the very issue the 
permanent neglect proceeding is meant to decide.127 
In response, the Supreme Court requires that “state intervention to terminate 
the relationship between [a parent] and [the] child must be accomplished by 
procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.”128  In addition, 
the Court mandates that in order to terminate parental rights, the state must 
 
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993); In the Matter of the Termination of Parental 
Rights to T.R.M., 303 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Wis. 1981). 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 121. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923). 
 122. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  In stating the monumental importance of 
terminating parental rights, the Supreme Court has stated that the right to raise children is 
“‘essential’” and one of the “‘basic civil rights of man’” that is “‘far more precious . . . than 
property rights.’”  Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)). 
 123. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
 124. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 753-54.  The Supreme Court explained that “[i]f anything, persons faced with the 
forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections 
than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.” Id (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. at 754 n.7 (emphasis in original). 
 128. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”129  Further, 
in understanding the importance and finality of any decision to terminate 
parental rights,130 but recognizing that the family is not beyond regulation, the 
Supreme Court has noted that any decision infringing on a parent’s 
fundamental liberty interest will be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.131 
The Supreme Court has previously explained that the meaning of due 
process under the United States Constitution is the “‘right to be heard before 
being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not 
involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic 
to our society.’”132  In addition, the Court stated that “[t]he fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.’”133  Although the Court recognized that the 
requirements of due process are flexible and should be tailored to each 
individual situation, the Court suggested guidelines to analyze the interests at 
stake and resolve questions that may arise.134  Specifically, the Court explained 
that, in order to determine whether a state has impeded on a fundamental 
liberty interest and therefore violated the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause, courts should consider: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.135 
Turning to the constitutional concerns related to the problem at hand, the 
question of whether adoptions pending the appeal of the termination of 
parental rights violates due process has not, to date, been brought before the 
United States Supreme Court.136  However, in recent years, the Court has 
decided other cases regarding the fundamental liberty interest of the parent-
 
 129. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48. 
 130. The proceeding to terminate parental rights has been characterized by the Supreme Court 
of Nevada as “tantamount to the imposition of a civil death penalty.” In the Matter of Parental 
Rights as to J.L.N., 55 P.3d 955, 958 (Nev. 1955). 
 131. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 132. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 133. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)). 
 134. Id. at 334. 
 135. Id. at 335. 
 136. In March of 2003, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari to review 
the decision 2001 of In re Tekela.  Wanda Cooper v. Illinois, 538 U.S. 915 (2003). 
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child relationship.137  These cases suggest that under strict scrutiny of the 
Court, a state statute that impedes the parent-child relationship and the 
underlying liberty interest will be deemed to violate due process if it does not 
serve a compelling governmental interest.138 
In looking at subsequent adoptions finalized after a parent has appealed the 
underlying termination proceeding, a strong argument can be made that, by not 
providing for and allowing automatic stays of adoption proceedings when 
notice of appeal of underlying termination of parental rights has been given, 
the state is violating the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  
In the case of In re Tekela, although the Illinois Supreme Court determined 
that clear and convincing evidence did not exist and Mother’s rights should not 
have been terminated, Mother’s liberty interest in her children was 
nevertheless destroyed due to the premature adoption of her children.139  This 
violates the explicit holding of the Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer 
which stated that a parent’s rights should not be terminated unless clear and 
convincing evidence is shown to support destroying the liberty interest 
embedded in the parent-child relationship.140  When parents are prevented from 
reuniting with their children, not by a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence of parental unfitness, but by the premature adoption of their children 
during the appellate process, their constitutionally protected liberty interest has 
been destroyed through an unconstitutional procedure. 
In addition, in comparing the risk of erroneous decisions with the private 
interests when the state proceeds with subsequent adoptions while parents 
appeal the judgment terminating their parental rights, the Eldridge factors skew 
to such action being a violation of the Due Process Clause.  In such a situation, 
there are many private interests at stake.  In weighing the factors, one must 
take into consideration the interest of the government, and each party 
involved.141  Here, as in any conflict involved in the termination of parental 
rights and adoption, there are many conflicting interests between the natural 
parents, the child and the state. 
As discussed above, as long as the natural parent is able to supply the child 
with a safe and secure environment, the natural parents have a long accepted 
 
 137. E.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 138. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124-28 (holding that Mississippi precedent, which did not allow 
M.L.B. to appeal the termination of her parental rights in forma pauperis, violated the due 
process clause); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73-75 (holding that a Washington statute, which allowed any 
person to petition for visitation and authorized the state courts to grant visitation whenever it may 
serve the child best interests, was unconstitutional, as it infringed on a parent’s fundamental right 
to rear her children without showing through clear and convincing evidence that the visitation 
was to prevent harm to the child). 
 139. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 312-13. 
 140. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48. 
 141. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334 . 
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interest in the care and custody of their child and in the preservation of the 
parent-child relationship.142  In addition, the natural parents have an interest in 
obtaining an accurate and just decision regarding their parental rights.143  If the 
child is adopted before a parent has finished his (or her) appeal, both of these 
interests have been prematurely destroyed. 
Similar to the interests of the natural parent, the child also has an interest in 
maintaining a parent-child relationship and building bonds with his (or her) 
natural parent.144  In addition, the child has an interest in residing in a safe and 
stable home environment that is permanent and secure.145  Only when the court 
finds that the natural parent cannot provide a safe and secure home does the 
child’s interest lie in residing without the natural parent.146  However, as long 
as the natural parent’s home is safe and the parent is not deemed unfit, the 
child has a strong interest in remaining with the natural parent.147 
In contrast, the state has a plethora of interests that must be reviewed and 
weighed against the interest of the parent and child.  First, like the natural 
parents, the state has an interest in obtaining an accurate and just determination 
of the parent’s fitness.148  In addition, the state also has an administrative 
interest in reducing the financial cost and burden of the proceedings and 
services required to terminate parental rights.149  Finally, states have a 
compelling interest in protecting the children who reside in their state from 
harm.150  Through the state’s parens patrae power, states have an urgent 
interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the children in their state.151  
To do this, the state must identify parents who pose a risk to children and 
proceed with terminating the rights of the parent if reasonable efforts do not 
lead to a remedy of the dangerous or harmful situation.  However, if there is 
reason to believe that a positive and nurturing relationship can exist between 
the natural parent and child, it is well accepted that the state’s interest favors 
preserving and not severing the natural familial bonds.152 
 
 142. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
 143. Id. at 765 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27). 
 144. Id. at 761. 
 145. Id. at 788-98 (Rhenquist, J. dissenting) (explaining that a safe, stable and loving 
homelife is essential to a child’s physical emotional and spiritual well being). 
 146. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761. 
 147. Id.at 760. 
 148. Id. at 766 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). 
 149. Id. at 766.  It is estimated that in fiscal year 2000 total spending for out-of-home care, 
including federal, state and local funding, was at least 9.1 billion dollars.  United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Foster 
Care National Statistics, at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/foster.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2005). 
 150. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 767.  See also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652 (explaining that there is “no gain towards 
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Next, Eldridge requires an analysis of whether, by allowing for subsequent 
adoptions while a parent appeals the underlying judgment terminating their 
parental rights, there is an increased risk of erroneous decisions.153  As the 
decision of In re Tekela demonstrates, such erroneous decisions are possible 
and have occurred.154  Appealing a judgment can be a lengthy process in the 
United States, while adoption, in many cases, occurs quickly.155  If a parent 
fails to meet a state’s requirements for a stay, or a judge ruling on a motion to 
stay denies the motion, the effects can be devastating.  The adoption could be 
final and unappealable long before a parent or the trial judge receives the final 
ruling from the appellate court on the necessary termination.  If the termination 
is reversed, the parent is left stripped of his or her child and the relationship 
that is considered “fundamental” without a finding of unfitness.  As case law 
has shown, the risk being discussed has occurred due to the absence of 
automatic stays.156  In contrast, such a risk of erroneous outcomes can be 
greatly reduced by requiring states to automatically stay judgments to 
terminate parental rights upon notice of an appeal. 
In light of the above factors, it is apparent that the states’ interest in 
reducing the cost of terminating parental rights is comparatively slight 
compared to the risk that erroneous decisions can occur that would strip the 
natural parent of their fundamental and constitutionally protected interest in a 
relationship with their children.  Therefore, there is a strong possibility that a 
state that does not require the automatic stay of adoption proceedings, but 
instead allows adoptions to proceed before a final decision is rendered, is in 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 
B. Policy Concerns 
Notwithstanding the constitutional concerns discussed above, there are also 
strong policy arguments that courts and state legislators should examine when 
either determining whether a change should be made to their state’s current 
appellate procedure or interpreting ambiguous language in their current 
statutory rules. 
First, by not providing for automatic stays of adoptions pending appeal, the 
integrity of the judicial system is strongly diminished.157  If the appellate court 
finds that a parent’s rights have been wrongly terminated, courts are forced to 
 
[the state’s] declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. . .the State 
spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates [a child] from his family”). 
 153. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 154. See In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 304. 
 155. Id. at 312. 
 156. See e.g., In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d 304; State ex rel. T.W., 133 S.W.3d 41.  See also In 
the Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d 273; In the Interest of Baby Boy N, 874 P.2d 680; Jean Ann 
Kobinski, 738 P.2d 895. 
 157. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 225. 
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make a choice between taking a child away from the safe and stable home of 
an adoptive parent where the child has found permanence, or alternatively, 
severing the relationship between the natural parent and child without a finding 
of unfitness and leaving the natural parent whose rights have been wrongly 
terminated without a remedy.158  Likewise, if stays are not automatic, but are 
instead allowed at the discretion of the trial judge, the granting of appeals 
could be allowed or disallowed according to one judge’s bias or whim and 
stays may not be uniformly granted.159  This choice distorts the nature of 
appellate review and leaves a black cloud on the granting of relief.160 
Similarly, such a dilemma leaves open the risk that states could be tempted 
to delay the adjudication leading to the judgment terminating parental rights in 
order to find a suitable adoptive family and subsequently race to an order of 
adoption as soon as possible after such judgment is rendered.161  This risk 
exists when having a decree of adoption would effectively moot any challenge 
to the judgment terminating parental rights, as once an adoption is final parents 
will be left without a remedy whether they succeed on appeal or not.162 
Finally, and arguably most importantly, allowing adoptions before the 
appeal is final leaves all of the parties involved, including the child and the 
adoptive parents in a situation with no finality or stability.163  In Michigan, the 
trial court allowed the adoption in In re JK to take place pending appeal and 
termed the adoption an “at risk” adoption.164  The court recognized the chance 
that the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights might be declared 
erroneous but nonetheless placed the child for adoption.165  In In re JK, the 
Michigan Supreme Court reprimanded the trial court for granting the “at risk” 
adoption and explained that such adoptions will have a “significant effect on 
the lives of everyone connected with this case.”166  Allowing an adoption, 
knowing that the bond and relationship the adoptive parent forms with the 
child could ultimately be torn apart, can have a traumatic psychological effect 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. See In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 315 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (stating that such a system 
“places a parent’s fundamental rights wholly at the mercy of a judge’s subjective view of what is 
fair”). 
 160. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 217. 
 161. In re Tekela, 780 N.E.2d at 315 (Harrison, J., dissenting). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216, 225 (expressing concern over the necessity of removing 
the child from the adoptive parents in order to “give faithful effect to the law”); Jean Ann 
Kobinski, 738 P.2d at 898 (expressing concern over the “possibility of future trauma to the 
child”); In the Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d at 275 (explaining that, had the court been required to 
reverse the termination of parental rights, it would have serious effects on the children, adoptive 
parents and natural parents). 
 164. In re JK, 661 N.W.2d at 225 n.25. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 225. 
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on all parties involved, especially the child.167  Furthermore, even if the trial 
court does not deem the adoption to be “at risk” of reversal, a proceeding 
terminating parental rights is always “subject to careful scrutiny on appeal and 
reversal is always a possibility.”168  Therefore, finalizing the adoption of 
children, in any case, before an appeal of the underlying termination has been 
adjudicated always carries the grave risk that the stability and finality given to 
the child will have to be destroyed in order to give faithful effect to the law. 
The above policy concerns, which have been stated by courts when 
determining whether stays of the adoption should have been given upon notice 
of appeal, point to the conclusion that the “status quo” should be preserved 
pending appeal by providing for automatic stays of subsequent adoption 
proceedings and the underlying judgment terminating parental rights. 
C. Proposed Solution 
In response to the concerns raised above, a proposed model statute is laid 
out below.  This statute does not alter statutory provisions that allow states to 
protect their interest in terminating the rights of parents who are deemed unfit 
through clear and convincing evidence.  Instead, the model statute is a proposal 
to protect the constitutional rights of parents whose parental rights have been 
wrongly terminated by providing for the automatic stay of adoption 
proceedings pending a final decision on appeal.  In addition, the model statute 
provides for a strict expedited timeline for the appellate process in order to 
comply with the mandate set by ASFA and to protect children from 
languishing in the foster care system during a lengthy appellate process. 
Proposed Model Statute—Appeals, Termination of Parental Rights169 
Section 1: Legislative Findings 
1. Natural parents have a interest in both maintaining a relationship with 
their child unless deemed by the court to be unfit and in appealing any 
wrongful termination of their parental rights. 
2. The State has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent 
homes for children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of 
 
 167. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788-89 (Rhenquist, J. dissenting) (stating that “a stable, loving 
homelife is essential to a child’s physical, emotional and spiritual wellbeing”).  See also MARY 
ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE LEGAL BATTLE, AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 98 (2000) (stating that children who lose a parent have an increased 
risk of emotional and social dysfunction in adulthood). 
 168. Kobinski, 738 P.2d at 898. 
 169. Portions of this model statute were compiled by examining statutes in various states.  See 
FLA. R. APP. P. 9.146; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 305; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2407 (1994); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 710.56(2) (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. 453.011 (West 2003). 
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adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting 
the needs of children. 
3. Adoptive children have the right to permanence and stability in their 
adoptive placement. 
4. Adoptive parents have a constitutional interest in retaining custody of a 
legally adopted child. 
Section 2: Legislative Purpose 
1. To provide procedures to insure children, parents, guardians and other 
interested parties the constitutionally protected right to due process by 
assuring hearings by an impartial court with recognition and 
enforcement of all parties’ constitutional rights, while insuring that 
public safety as well as the interests of the integrity of the court and the 
state government are simultaneously protected. 
2. To encourage timely and permanent placements for children with 
families suitable to meet their individual needs. 
3. To provide for the safety, care and protection of children and to ensure 
and promote the health and well-being of all children in the state’s care. 
Section 3: Definitions 
1. “Adoption” Creating a legal relationship between a parent and child 
where it did not already exist.  Declaring the child to legally be the 
child of the adoptive parents and entitled to all the rights, and 
privileges, and subject to all obligations of a child born to such adoptive 
parents. 
2. “Child” Any person under the age of eighteen who has not been 
emancipated. 
3. “Child Placement Agency” Any person, society, association or 
institution licensed by the Department of Child and Family Services to 
care for, receive, or board children and to place children in a licensed 
child caring institution or a foster or adoptive home. 
4. “Court” The state supreme court, the court of appeals, and the circuit 
court in exercise of jurisdiction described by state statute. 
5. “Order” A decision, order, judgment, decree or rule of a lower tribunal, 
excluding minutes and minute book entries. 
6. “Parent” A woman who gave birth to a child, the putative father of the 
child and the husband of the woman who gave birth to the child at the 
time the child was conceived.  If a child has been legally adopted, the 
term “parent” also includes the adoptive mother and father of the child. 
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Section 4: Appellate Procedure—Termination of Parental Rights 
1. An appeal from an order terminating parental rights must be taken 
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the order by the appellant in 
court, thirty-five (35) days from the mailing of the order to appellant by 
the clerk of the court, or thirty (30) days after service by a party or law 
guardian of the appellant. 
2. The record shall be filed by the circuit court within thirty (30) days 
after notice of the appeal is filed in the circuit court. 
3. Appellant’s brief must be filed within thirty (30) days of the filing of 
the record on appeal. 
4. Respondent’s brief must be filed within thirty (30) days of the filing of 
appellant’s brief. 
5. Any reply brief must be filed within ten (10) days of the filing of 
respondent’s brief. 
6. In no event shall the court permit more than one request for an 
extension by either party. 
7. The court shall give priority over other civil litigation to appeals filed 
under this rule in reaching a determination on the status of the 
termination of parental rights by entering scheduling orders to ensure 
that a ruling will be entered within thirty (30) days of the close of oral 
arguments. 
Section 5: Effect of Appeal—Stays of Proceedings 
1. A termination of parental rights order, with placement of the child with 
a licensed child placement agency or the Department of Child and 
Family Services for subsequent adoption, shall automatically be 
suspended upon timely notice of appeal to the trial court while the 
appeal is pending. 
2. No bond will be required with respect to a stay pending appeal of the 
termination of parental rights. 
3. During the appeal, the child shall continue in the custody of the 
Division of Child and Family Services or other child placement agency 
under the order until the appeal is decided.  The Division of Child and 
Family Services or other child placement agency, through the 
jurisdiction of the trial court, will continue to have the authority to 
make decisions regarding the care, custody and support of the child. 
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4. The automatic stay under this rule shall stay the power to enter an order 
of adoption without the parents consent as well as the power of any 
person or agency to consent to an adoption for the parent. 
D. Arguments In Support of Proposed Model Statute 
The above legislation is not intended to decrease the rights of states to 
terminate the parental rights of unfit parents when termination is in the best 
interest of the child.  Nor should the legislation be interpreted as obscuring the 
rights of states to proceed with adoptions after termination has occurred.  
When a parent is unfit, both termination and adoption are essential to realize 
the child’s right to a safe, permanent and stable home environment.  Instead, 
the above legislation is intended to enable parents to realize their protected 
right to appeal a judgment wrongfully entered against them.  The proposed 
statute is intended to bring balance back into the legal system that seems to 
have been lost in the states’ quest to comply with the ASFA and promote 
speedier adoptions.  The proposed legislation allows states to remain in 
compliance with the ASFA mandates, while simultaneously satisfying any 
constitutional and policy concerns that arise under a system that allows for 
adoptions pending the outcome of a rightful appeal. 
1. Compliance with the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
Although the proposed legislation could slow down the timing of 
adoptions in cases where a parent appeals the termination judgment, the 
proposal still allows and encourages states to maintain compliance with the 
requirements of the ASFA.  The ASFA requires states to make reasonable 
efforts for reunification for 12 months after the child enters the custody of the 
state.170  In addition, the ASFA requires states to petition for the termination of 
parental rights after the child has been in care for 15 out of the most recent 22 
months.171  Further, the ASFA requires states to “identify, recruit, process, and 
approve a qualified family for adoption.”172  Because the above legislation 
does not alter the state’s right to terminate parental rights, and does not attempt 
to modify the state’s procedure during the underlying termination proceedings, 
states that enact legislation like that proposed will not fall out of compliance 
with the ASFA. 
In addition, while a parent is appealing the termination of their parental 
rights and a stay is in effect, the legislation provides that the stay will not 
change the states’ jurisdiction over the care, custody and support of the child.  
 
 170. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 101(a)(15)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 
671(a)(15)(B)(ii). 
 171. Id. § 103(a)(3)(E); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
 172. Id. 
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This gives states the right to move children into pre-adoptive homes and 
monitor their progress while the appeal is proceeding.  The only power lost to 
states is the power to finalize such adoptions until the appeal is completed.  
Further, because the legislation promotes expediting the appellate process in 
termination of parental rights cases, children will not languish in the foster care 
system, as required by the ASFA.  Although staying adoption proceedings 
while an appeal is proceeding will slow the adoption process, states will not be 
allowing children to languish, as they will be diligently attempting to resolve 
the situation through an expedited appellate process. 
2. Putting Constitutional Concerns to Rest 
In addition to allowing states to remain in compliance with the ASFA, the 
proposed legislation lays to rest any constitutional concerns that may arise 
when states does not provide for automatic stays and instead allow for the 
subsequent adoption of children before an appeal has concluded.  This 
legislation satisfies the interests of all parties, including the parent, the child 
and the state. 
The interest of the child in residing in a safe, permanent and stable home 
environment173 is satisfied, as the child can be placed in a safe home while the 
appeal is pending and will not be returned to a dangerous environment.  In 
addition, the state has the authority to place the child in a pre-adoptive home 
during the appeal to make the transition to adoption easier if the underlying 
termination is upheld.  Further, the child will not be left to languish in multiple 
foster homes during a lengthy appellate process, as the process has been 
expedited to allow for a faster resolution of the case. 
In addition, the interest of both the parent and the state to gain an accurate 
and just decision regarding their parental rights is satisfied.174  The parent is 
able to appeal the judgment without fear that their children will be adopted in 
the process, leaving them without a remedy if the judgment is reversed.  
Similarly, although the state will have to maintain support of the child during 
the appeal, the court will simultaneously reduce the financial burden of 
maintaining the care, custody and support of the child during the appeal by 
expediting the time it will take to obtain a just, accurate and final decision on 
appeal. 
Likewise, providing for automatic stays pending appeal will substantially 
lower the risk that an erroneous decision may occur during the proceedings.  
By providing for automatic stays, the risk that a parent would be denied a stay 
or would not meet the requirements of the stay is greatly reduced.  In effect, 
there is a reduced chance that a finalized adoption will occur during the appeal, 
which greatly decreases the risk that an erroneous decision will be rendered or 
 
 173. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788-89 (Rhenquist, J. dissenting). 
 174. Id. at 766. 
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that parents will be left without a remedy if the judgment terminating parental 
rights is overturned.  Although there is still a chance that judges will 
erroneously disregard the mandate and proceed with an adoption during the 
appeal despite statutory language that clearly provides otherwise,175 if such an 
adoption would occur, the judiciary has a clear way of examining the problem 
and determining the rightful solution.  As a result, states are able to maintain 
the right of parents to appeal judgments and are providing for fundamentally 
fair procedures when terminating a parent’s protected right to their children, as 
required by the Supreme Court.176  Such a proposal should withstand the strict 
judicial scrutiny that is applied to procedures that terminate a parent’s 
fundamentally protected right. 
3. Grounded in Policy 
In addition to maintaining compliance with the ASFA and satisfying any 
constitutional concerns, the proposed legislation is also supported by policy. 
First, automatic stays of the judgment terminating parental rights and any 
subsequent adoption upon notice of appeal maintains the integrity of the 
judicial system that is arguably lost when such stays do not take place.177  As 
long as courts comply with the statutory mandate to automatically stay 
subsequent adoption proceedings, courts will no longer be forced to make the 
difficult decision of taking away the rights of the adoptive parent or 
alternatively leaving the natural parent without the remedy afforded to them.178  
Instead, appellate courts can focus only on the issue brought before them: 
whether the trial court rightfully terminated the rights of the natural parents. 
Similarly, by providing for stays of adoptions until an appeal is complete, 
the adoptive parent will not have to endure the emotional upheaval of having 
an adopted child removed from their home.  Once a court finalizes an adoption, 
the adoptive parent has an interest in bonding and maintaining a relationship 
with the child by providing for them both physically and emotionally.  By 
providing for automatic stays and not allowing premature or “at risk” 
adoptions to take place, not only are appellate courts relieved of making a 
decision between an adoptive parent and a natural parent, but the adoptive 
parent is also relieved of the turmoil and emotional effect that such a decision 
is bond to have.179  It has been noted that if adoptive parents feel they are “at 
risk” of losing the adopted child, they are less likely to make an effort to bond 
 
 175. See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d 216. 
 176. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 177. See In re JK, 661 N.W.2d. at 225. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See In the Interest of J.R.G., 624 So. 2d at 275 (explaining that, had the court been 
required to reverse the termination of parental rights, it would have serious effects on the 
children, adoptive parents and natural parents). 
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emotionally with the child.180  Under the proposed legislation, the child can be 
placed in the home of the prospective adoptive parent, but the legal ties will 
not be made until after a decision on appeal is rendered.  This legislation 
ensures that any legal and emotional bonds made between the adoptive parent 
and child after the adoption occurs cannot and will not be torn apart, and 
therefore logically promotes the creation of such bonds. 
In addition, if a system with automatic stays during appeals is 
implemented, children are ultimately afforded more stability and permanence 
in their adoptive placements.  Allowing for adoptions, even those deemed “at 
risk” of reversal, does not provide the child with permanency and stability.  
Instead, such a system provides the child with the risk of yet another 
detrimental upheaval.  Studies have shown that a child who loses a parent, 
whether through death or a legal process, has an increased risk of emotional 
and social problems in adulthood.181  If the child’s relationship “is interrupted 
more than once, as happens with multiple foster placements in the early years, 
the children’s emotional attachments become increasingly shallow and 
indiscriminate.”182  If adoption proceedings are stayed during the appellate 
process, an order of adoption will have more impact and will be more likely to 
induce the feeling of finality and stability that is much needed in the life of any 
child who has been removed from his/her home. 
Finally, when the appellate process is expedited, children will not be 
forced to languish in the foster care system or in pre-adoptive homes while 
waiting for what could be a lengthy appellate process to proceed.  Although 
this Comment promotes stays of adoption, it does not promote children 
suffering in the foster care system for excessive amounts of time, as “even in a 
loving, long term foster home, the uncertainty of the foster care status may 
cause hardship.”  Instead, the proposed statute promotes an expedited appellate 
process, which will lessen the risk of excessive foster care.  This allows 
adoptive parents and children to form much needed attachments and bonds to 
each other as soon as possible183 while still allowing natural parents the right to 
appeal any judgment against them. 
 
 180. See Jessica K. Heldman, Comment, Court Delay and the Waiting Child, 40 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV 1001, 1010 n.60 (stating that adoptive parents may be anxious or tentative in developing 
bonds with the child). 
 181. MASON, supra note 167, at 98. 
 182. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST 
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 19 (1996). 
 183. “A child’s attachment to the parent and the parent’s attachment to the child are 
considered factors that protect against delinquency.”  Heldman, supra note 180, at 1011 n.69 
(2003) (citing Sharon G. Elstein, Understanding the Relationship between Maltreatment and 
Delinquency, 18 CHILD L. PRAC. 136, 139 (1999)). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
As stated, the ASFA was one of the most significant pieces of child 
welfare legislation in United States history.  It promoted the idea that, while 
states should make reasonable efforts to reunify families after removing 
children from the homes of their parents, significant efforts should be made to 
stop children from languishing in the foster care system and to promote 
adoption after the termination of parental rights.  Using the ASFA mandates as 
guidance, states enacted statutes to comply with the federal legislation, but 
arguably swung too far in their quest to finalize a greater number of adoptions 
at the expense of the parents’ right to appeal. 
As the cases of In re Tekela, In re J.K. and State ex rel. T.W. v. The 
Honorable Steven R. Ohmer, Judge indicate, there are major implications when 
states choose not to automatically stay adoption proceedings while parents 
pursue their appellate rights and choose instead to finalize adoptions before the 
outcome of the appeal is known.  Both constitutional and policy-based 
concerns exist regarding such procedures.  If the appellate court ultimately 
decides that the parent’s rights were unlawfully terminated, the state is faced 
with having to “unscramble the proverbial egg” by overturning the subsequent 
adoption or leaving the parents without a remedy. 
The proposed statutory changes promoted in this Comment are not 
intended to reward negligent and unfit parents, but are intended to preserve the 
rights of parents whose rights have been wrongly terminated.  Although it is 
clear that no simple or perfect solution exists, and a compromise is necessary, 
the proposed legislation protects the union between the child and natural parent 
as well as the appellate rights of the natural parent while simultaneously 
promoting the purpose of the ASFA to reduce the number of children 
languishing in foster care and to promote adoption.  It is extremely important 
for states to promote the safety and security of children; however, states must 
still ensure that the appellate rights of parents are maintained to ensure a 
remedy if the “system” breaks down and parental rights are wrongly 
terminated. 
In conclusion, it is not merely the responsibility of the legislature but also 
the judicial branch to promote change.  While it is imperative to sever the 
rights of unfit parents and to promote stability for children, it is also extremely 
important that states maintain the rights of parents during the quest for 
stability.  In order to maintain the rights of the state, the child and the parents, a 
partnership must be forged between the judicial branch and the legislature to 
examine the procedures currently used during an appeal from the termination 
of parental rights and promote changes to automatically stay subsequent 
adoption proceedings and expedite the appellate process.  States should not
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idly sit waiting for a problem to arise under current procedural guidelines that 
do not provide for stays, but should instead be proactive in their advocacy. 
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